ICS Sets Out Future for Arctic Shipping

Source: http://www.ics-shipping.org

PIC SOURCE: http://ocean-noise.com

The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), which represents over 80% of the world merchant fleet, has issued a new position paper on Arctic shipping.

As the Arctic becomes more accessible, ICS has set out some key principles with regard to the future governance of Arctic waters.

Offshore support vessel activity is already significant, while destination shipping is anticipated to grow as the extraction of energy and raw materials is developed.  Use of the Northern Sea Route is also a reality for a small but increasing number of ships in the summer months.    

ICS therefore stresses the importance of Arctic nations respecting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and relevant IMO Conventions and Codes such as SOLAS and MARPOL.

ICS Director of External Relations, Mr Simon Bennett explained: “As the volume of Arctic shipping gradually increases, there is a growing awareness about the need for a high degree of care when ships navigate Arctic waters.  However, the proper forum for addressing these concerns is the International Maritime Organization, which is currently developing a Polar Code that is expected to be mandatory.  It is most important that Arctic nations avoid unilateral measures that might cut across IMO Conventions or the provisions of UNCLOS.”

ICS stresses that individual coastal states should not impose discriminatory treatment that might prejudice the rights of ships registered with non-Arctic nations under international maritime law, such as unilateral ship construction, design and equipment standards.

ICS also identifies some issues that require clarification as Arctic waters become more accessible.  For example, ICS believes that the UNCLOS regime of ‘transit passage’ for straits used for international navigation takes precedence over the rights of coastal states to enact unilateral measures against international shipping.

“Until recently this issue seemed rather academic, as did the question of nations using straight baselines to determine their territorial sea.  But as remote Arctic sea routes become accessible these issues are becoming more important.” said Mr Bennett.

Amongst the intended audience for the ICS paper are high level policy makers in environment and foreign ministries who may not be regularly engaged in shipping issues. 

However, the paper also outlines ICS’s approach towards the development of the IMO Polar Code, which is expected to be finalised next year.

“The development of the Polar Code needs to be risk and performance-based” said Mr Bennett. “For example, pending the future development of unified requirements for the construction and operation of ‘ice-class’ ships, the Code should not arbitrarily require conformity with any particular ‘ice-class’ standards to the exclusion of others that deliver comparable performance.”

The paper also sets out ICS’s position with respect to the development of infrastructure to support safety and environmental protection, the need for full market access and freedom of navigation, transparency with respect to national regulation and the need for reduced bureaucracy and the setting of appropriate fees for services.

“If frequent and reliable international shipping services are to be provided between Arctic ports and the rest of the world, or natural resources in the region are to be developed in a manner that reconciles the need for both environmental and economic sustainably, this will require the provision of maritime services that are competitive and cost efficient” said Mr Bennett.

POSITION PAPER ON ARCTIC SHIPPING

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is the principal international trade association for shipowners, representing all sectors and trades and over 80% of the world merchant fleet. ICS membership comprises national shipowners’ associations from 36 countries, including nations located within and outside the Arctic Circle.

Reported changes to the world’s climate appear to be increasing the accessibility of the Arctic to international shipping.1These changes, as well as new interest in developing the Arctic’s natural resources, are likely to increase shipping traffic navigating through the region.

As the volume of Arctic shipping gradually increases, there is a growing awareness and concern within the international community about the potential sensitivity of Arctic ecosystems to the impact of such activity and the necessity for a high degree of care when ships navigate Arctic waters. These concerns are fully acknowledged and shared by international ship operators, as represented by ICS which is totally committed to the protection of the environment and the prevention of pollution.

The following position paper is therefore intended to establish some key principles with respect to the governance of maritime activity in the Arctic and the regulation of ships navigating Arctic waters.

INTRODUCTION

Arctic shipping has become a key issue of focus at the United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO). This includes the current development by IMO Member States of a mandatory code to be complied with by all ships operating in polar waters.

When finalised, it is anticipated that the International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (‘Polar Code’) will become mandatory through amendments to the IMO Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and the IMO Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).2These IMO Conventions are already widely ratified and enforced on a global basis.

Indications of thinner ice and longer ice free (northern) summer periods have opened up the possibility of increased international shipping activity:

• Increased offshore support vessel activity (supporting offshore exploration and extraction of oil and gas);

• Increased destination transport, with ships moving raw materials (and goods) from and between Arctic ports and the rest of the world;

• The beginnings of commercially viable intercontinental Northern sea routes, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via the Northeast Passage/Northern Sea Route and, potentially in the future, via the Northwest passage.

Offshore support vessel activity already represents a significant form of shipping in the Arctic region, while destination transport is anticipated to grow considerably in the next few years as new sources of raw materials, such as iron ore, are developed.

Although the expected timeline for the opening up of intercontinental sea routes is currently very unclear, and for the immediate future their impact on traditional shipping routes should probably not be overestimated, use of the Northern Sea Route is already a reality for a small but increasing number of merchant ships during the northern summer months.

Independent of climate change, the development of new technologies that make possible operations in remote regions with hostile sea and weather conditions is stimulating an increased interest in Arctic shipping. This is driven to a large extent by rising commodity prices and the search for natural resources such as gas, oil, metal ores and minerals throughout the Arctic region. As well as increasing the demand for shipping services that can support the extraction of seemingly abundant natural resources, maritime trade between Arctic destinations and the rest of the world is expected to increase as a result of this new economic activity. The demand for maritime tourism in the Arctic is also expected to grow, facilitated by increasing accessibility and improvements to ship design and maritime safety.

PRINCIPLES

ICS and its member national shipowners’ associations advocate the following principles with respect to the governance of maritime activity in the Arctic and the regulation of ships navigating Arctic waters:

1. Formulation of a mandatory, uniform regulatory framework concerning Arctic shipping to ensure maritime safety and environmental protection

IMO is the appropriate forum for the development of standards for vessels operating in the Arctic, as it has the necessary legal and technical expertise to facilitate engagement by, and take into account the interests of, all of the world’s maritime nations including flag States and coastal States.

In order to ensure a workable and enforceable regulatory approach that will deliver safe marine navigation and security, enable commercially viable operations and optimise environmental protection, all current national maritime regulatory regimes applicable to Arctic waters, within the jurisdiction of States that are members of the Arctic Council,3should be harmonised in conformity with the final IMO ‘Polar Code’, as well as all other relevant IMO Conventions and Codes, consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Arctic nations should only apply requirements to foreign flag ships consistent with ‘generally accepted international rules and standards’ (GAIRAS).

ICS believes that the development of a mandatory IMO Polar Code needs to be undertaken in a manner that is genuinely risk-based, so that requirements imposed on ships take full account of the hazards relevant to the type of ship operation, the ship location and the season of operation. Furthermore, the risk mitigation measures that are adopted into the Code should be performance-based. For example, pending the future development by IMO of unified international requirements for the construction and operation of ‘ice-class’ ships, the Code should not arbitrarily require conformity with any particular ‘ice-class’ standards that currently exist to the exclusion of other standards that deliver comparable performance with respect to safety and environmental protection.

The particular interest and engagement in maritime issues exhibited by those nations that comprise the Arctic Council is welcome and fully acknowledged. However, it is important that the Arctic Council or any other nations or bodies with an interest in Arctic shipping refrain from calls to develop alternative instruments or requirements that cut across or cause conflict with regulations or guidance developed by IMO.

Any country, including Arctic nations, that has not yet ratified UNCLOS is strongly encouraged to do so as soon as possible.

Regional Memorandums of Understanding on Port State Control may also have a role in developing uniform procedures for the inspection and enforcement of regulations that have been adopted by IMO within the Arctic region, including the Polar Code.

2. Development of Arctic maritime infrastructure to support safety and environmental protection

While the IMO Polar Code will provide the regulatory framework, the infrastructure needed to ensure safety and environmental protection in the Arctic must also be developed. This includes inter alia aids to navigation, nautical charts, means of satellite communication, bunkering facilities, port reception facilities for ship’s waste, pilotage in shallow passages, possible ice-breaking assistance, as well as search and rescue infrastructure developed for defined incident scenarios and the provision of adequate ‘places of refuge’ should ships be in distress.

In particular, a commitment is required by IMO (and IHO) Member States to conduct the necessary hydrographic surveys in order to bring Arctic navigational charts up to a level acceptable to support safe navigation, as well as systems to support the real-time acquisition, analysis and transfer of meteorological, oceanographic, sea ice and iceberg data.

Serious challenges related to life-saving and oil spill clean-up capability in remote or hostile waters or where sea ice potentially presents an obstacle must be also addressed. In particular, in co-operation with IMO, this requires increased co-ordination amongst Arctic nations to promote the region’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capability.6

3. Full participation of shipping nations

Given the important implications for all IMO Member States of current and future regulatory discussions, it is vital that all maritime nations, in their capacity as flag States and coastal States, are fully and actively involved in all decision making processes that impact on Arctic shipping.

ICS believes that it is particularly important that non-Arctic nations are fully included in any regulatory discussions affecting Arctic shipping from the outset. The rights of coastal States located within the Arctic (Canada, Denmark including Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States) must be acknowledged. However, such rights must always be exercised in a manner that remains consistent with UNCLOS and IMO Conventions.

Coastal States should not impose discriminatory treatment or other measures upon ships registered with non-Arctic nations that might prejudice the interests and rights of nations or ship operators under international maritime law. Examples of potentially prejudicial measures include: unilateral ship construction, design and equipment standards; navigation requirements including mandatory navigation or ice-breaker service fees; and the imposition of additional insurance requirements.

4. Full market access and freedom of navigation

Unilateral, national or regional regulations governing ship safety, environmental protection and other shipping matters should be avoided and they must not disadvantage ships registered with non-Arctic States. This includes regulations and enforcement mechanisms that Arctic coastal States might seek to introduce within ice-covered waters inside the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which should be addressed internationally via the regulatory framework provided by IMO.

ICS believes that the UNCLOS regime of transit passage for straits used for international navigation (as codified in Part III of UNCLOS) takes precedence over the rights of coastal States under Article 234. Maintenance of this principle also has implications for other international straits outside the Arctic that have vital strategic and political significance.

Regulations governing market access should be consistent with commitments made by governments at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, where relevant, with the Principles of Common Shipping Policy adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2000.

5. Need for legal clarity about status of Arctic

ICS suggests that the legal status of Arctic waters needs to be clarified at the United Nations level.

In general, in all waters save ‘internal waters’, the right of ‘innocent passage’ within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ ), as enshrined by UNCLOS, must always apply. However, clarification is needed about the definition of internal waters, including the use of straight baselines with respect to islands situated off a mainland, as Arctic sea routes become more accessible.

The relationship between UNCLOS Article 234 and the UNCLOS regime of transit passage for straits used for international navigation also needs to be clarified, now that straits in the Arctic region are actually starting to be used by international shipping.

The above notwithstanding, Article 234 of UNCLOS permits coastal States to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of EEZ, where particularly severe climatic conditions and “the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year” create obstructions, or where “exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance”.

However, ICS believes a debate is required as to what is meant in UNCLOS by “most of the year” as Arctic waters become ice free for longer periods. Questions need to be resolved about the rights of coastal States to enforce unilateral laws and charges when Arctic waters are indeed “ice free”, the definition of “ice free”, and the extent to which hazards to navigation may be regarded as “exceptional” during ice free periods.

It is also vital that international ship operators have clarity with respect to which nations or organisations are responsible for ensuring the safety of maritime transport in Arctic waters. This applies particularly to waters beyond the territorial sea.

The need for answers to political questions about the extent of the continental shelf of Arctic nations is also of indirect concern to shipping. So long as it remains unclear which nations are entitled to develop natural resources in the Arctic, uncertainty about demand for shipping services and the need to invest in supporting infrastructure will remain. The right to navigate ships in the Arctic should not be treated as a bargaining counter in disputes about the right to exploit natural resources.

6. Transparency of national regulations

As stated above, national regulations should be consistent with UNCLOS, IMO Conventions and Codes, and the principle of ‘generally accepted international rules and standards’ (GAIRAS).

Wherever national rules apply to ship operations in Arctic waters, they should be transparent and comprehensible. As well as being made readily available to shipping companies and ships’ crews via the internet, they should always be available in the English language.

7. Reducing bureaucracy and setting appropriate fees for services

Consistent with coastal States’ rights and obligations under UNCLOS, the development of Arctic shipping must take the commercial requirements of ship operators into consideration. For example, national requirements concerning long periods of advance notification prior to use of some Arctic sea routes are often impractical and incompatible with the way in which international shipping markets operate. In bulk shipping, moreover, the destination ports frequently change during the course of a ship’s voyage.

While the environmental challenges associated with operations in the Arctic are fully acknowledged, the especially high level of fees for some ice-breaking and other navigational services also needs to be examined if Arctic sea routes are to provide a commercially viable alternative to the Suez Canal or trans-Pacific sea routes. Likewise, if frequent and reliable international shipping services are to be provided between Arctic ports and the rest of the world, or natural resources in the region are to be developed in a manner that reconciles the need for both environmental and economic sustainably, this will require the provision of maritime services that are competitive and cost efficient.

100 years of disaster relationship… (Titanic to Costa Concordia)

Published in Sagar Sandesh Maritime Weekly's Dec 12 (12-12-12) edition

Source:http://www.sagarsandesh.com/epaper/

-Whereas the Titanic collided with an iceberg, the Costa Concordia hit an underwater rock

-Trust in technology may in both cases have affected the attitude of the navigators of such ships

By Capt S Bhardwaj

 PIC courtesy: http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/discussion/women-and-children-first/attachment/120119-titanic-sinking/

Titanic was supposed to be the ‘unsinkable’ then; Costa Concordia was also a masterpiece of modern technology. Despite more than 100 years of regulatory and technological progress in maritime safety, accidents do occur.

Both the cases involved state-of-the-art cruise ships - although the same state and the stage have obviously changed dramatically in the 100 years in between.

Whereas the Titanic collided with an iceberg, the Costa Concordia hit an underwater rock. In both the incidents the ships were subjected to an unexpected and massive flooding.

While the maritime technology has changed beyond recognition between 1912 and 2012, human factors and organizational factors have not.

Organizations have, of course, changed in the way they carry out their work, due to increased horizontal and vertical integration made possible by ubiquitous information technology.

But the thinking and attitudes of management have changed less and may possibly not have changed at all, at least when it comes to such issues as risk taking and prioritization of issues relating to operational safety.

The purpose is rather to show that accidents still happen for the same underlying human and organizational reasons, despite the technological progress in the past 100 years and despite all safety regulations and precautions. It is remarkable that certain underlying conditions are still the same today as at the time of the Titanic.

It is even more remarkable - and worse, regrettable - that the accident investigations and the reactions to accidents more or less are the same now as they were 100 years ago.

Authority gradient and its influence on communication

The term “authority gradient” refers to the distribution of decision-making and the balance, or imbalance, of authority and power in a group or organization, usually in relation to a specific type of situation. Although it is rarely considered by the maritime industry, it plays an important role in, e.g., health care or aviation. It is used to describe how easy or difficult it may be for someone with a lower authority to question or challenge somebody with a higher authority. The authority gradient is itself influenced by a number of other factors, such as education, social background, gender, age, professional roles and perceived expertise.

Cognitive hysteresis - resistance to revising a situation assessment

 The term cognitive hysteresis – or psychological fixation - describes the situation where people fail to revise their initial assessments in response to new evidence, particularly evidence that diverges from the expected (Woods et al. 2010). While the initial situation assessment may have been appropriate at the time it was made, the cognitive hysteresis means that neither the assessment nor the chosen course of action is revised even if an opportunity for that arises.

A similar case of the Titanic or the Costa Concordia may have contributed to a situation where the masters held on to an imprecise or incorrect picture of the situation. He might have been so convinced by this wrong mental picture of the situation that it would have required some external questioning by his officers to force him to realize that the situation was different from what he assumed.

Unanticipated consequences of new technology:

 Another reason for underestimating risks may be reliance on new technology. The Titanic was considered a masterpiece of naval architecture in 1912. This might have led to the belief that a collision with an iceberg could be survived and that the ship would stay afloat even with severe structural damage to the hull.

In 2012, the Costa Concordia was equipped with significantly better technology. The navigation equipment alone provided an accurate position of the ship at any time on the sea chart and also showed the predicted future positions given the current course and speed.

Trust in technology may in both the cases have affected the attitude of the navigators of such ships.

PIC Courtesy:http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/travelnews/2012/01/pictures/120118-travel-costa-concordia/

Organizational influences (latent conditions)

Today ISM gives “overriding authority” to Master. Even Titanic master received a letter which he had to sign and return. The letter stated that “You are to dismiss all idea of competitive passages with other vessels and to concentrate your attention upon a cautious, prudent and ever watchful system of navigation, which shall lose time or suffer any other temporary inconvenience rather than incur the slightest risk which can be avoided.”

But there was also a conflicting message from management. In the Titanic accident report, Lord Mersey, the Judge heading the investigation, commented “Its root is probably to be found in the competition and in the desire of the public for quick passages rather in the judgement of the navigators”.

A similar dilemma can be found in the case of Costa Concordia, where the company advertised that the ship would sail a “touristy” sailing course close to land. The case is not simply that organizations (the blunt end) give one message - like “safety first” - but neglect to follow-up on it. The case is rather that organizations want to have their cake and eat it too, by emphasizing both safety and productivity. This creates a psychological and social conflict at the sharp end, where the outcome is uncertain.

In shipping operations, as in any other industry, time and resource constraints affect the day-to-day routines. The time and the measures taken to ensure safety operations have to be balanced with economical considerations in the commercial operation of a ship.

The desire to arrive in time with the ship has indeed often played a fatal role in accidents, such as Herald of Free Enterprise in1987 (DoT 1987), Estonia in 1994 (Joint Accident Investigation Commission 1997), the MSC Napoli in 2007 (Marine Accident Investigation Branch 2008) and of course the Titanic.

Maritime accident investigation & persistent human factors issues

Accident investigations very often seem to be constrained by the principles of What-You-Look- For-Is-What-You-Find and What-You-Find-Is-What-You-Fix Maritime accident investigations have traditionally looked for one or more distinct causes and tried to address them one by one, as if they were independent of each other.  The near universal assumption, expressed by the causality credo, is that every effect has a cause, and that the cause usually can be determined to be a failure or malfunction of a “component” - be it technological, human or organizational.

According to this logic, if we can find and fix the failure or the malfunction, then the risk will be reduced or even eliminated and safety therefore increased.

The causality credo, however, limits the scope of investigations to concrete and tangible causes, but neglects a host of other factors that are less conspicuous and have a more indirect influence. As the comparison of the fates that befell the Titanic and the Costa Concordia however shows, accidents seem to happen for the same underlying human and organizational reasons even though they are separated by a century of improvements to technology and safety regulations.

In the wider perspective, the really important question is therefore not why these and many other ships have foundered, but rather why these reasons remain and why accident investigations and the reactions to them are more or less the same now as they were 100 years ago.

One explanation is that safety thinking that focuses on things that go wrong or could go wrong, such as near misses, incidents and accidents.

The alternative perspective, called Safety-II, focuses on the situations of everyday work where things go right. In this case the purpose of safety efforts is to facilitate the performance adjustments that are necessary for everyday work to succeed, i.e., not only try to avoid things going wrong, but also try to ensure that they go right.

This cannot be done without understanding how things happen, including the many human and organizational factors that determine how work is carried out, for example the authority gradient, group think, cognitive hysteresis, unanticipated consequences of new technology, latent organizational  conditions, and the ubiquitous trade-offs between efficiency and thoroughness.

If no one is looking for the human and organizational factors described in this write-up, no one will find them. And if no one finds them, no one will do anything about them. Yet investigations of accidents in today's complex work environments cannot afford to look only at “component” malfunctions and failures. Actual safety improvements will not occur until we understand how functions depend on each other and at how seemingly subtle changes and performance variability can lead to out-of-scale outcomes.

Acknowledgements:

Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichs & Michael Baldauf (Maritime Risk and Safety (MaRiSa) Research Group, World Maritime University)

E. Hollnagel, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark. 

The similarities

- Both the masters were very experienced and had immaculate service records prior to the accidents. They had spent their entire professional life at sea without larger accidents.

- Both of them were aware of the potential dangers, but felt that the risks were so small that they could easily be controlled.

- In the case of the Titanic, no officer on the bridge objected to the navigation of the ship. So far, no information has been published to show that officers on the Costa Concordia disagreed with the manoeuvres of the master.

- In both the incidents, the shipping companies (White Star Line and Costa Crociere respectively) either tacitly approved or even encouraged the masters' decisions to prioritize performance over safety.

- Both accidents resulted in emergency situations for which the ships were not built (beyond design-base accidents). Both scenarios were also considered as being highly unlikely.

- In both accident scenarios, difficulties during evacuation occurred.

Pearl Harbor as a Noble Lie

Source: http://www.infowars.com/pearl-harbor-as-a-noble-lie/

Tim Kelly
Infowars.com
December 7, 2012

Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, rumors began to circulate challenging the official narrative that it was an unprovoked surprise attack. The cumulative evidence gathered over the last seventy years by scholars, journalists, and investigators vindicates those suspicious of treachery from the top; for it comprises a solid circumstantial case that Franklin D. Roosevelt and his top advisors deliberately provoked the attack and deliberately looked the other way before it came.

What was the reason for their treachery?

Roosevelt wanted to plunge the United States into the European war on the side of Great Britain but was unsuccessful in provoking Germany in the North Atlantic. So he decided that provoking a Japanese attack upon U.S. military bases in the Pacific would be the best way to achieve that objective. Since Japan was allied with Germany under the Tripartite Pact, Roosevelt calculated a war with Japan would sooner or later bring the United States into the war against Germany.

Most historians when pressed on the matter now grudgingly concede that Roosevelt lied when he told the American people that he would never send their boys to fight into foreign wars, but they excuse his treachery as a “noble lie,” a deception perpetrated against the public by the political elite to achieve a supposed greater good.

The Pearl Harbor noble-lie argument usually goes something like this: “Given the evil of Nazism and the threat that Hitler posed to the world, Roosevelt was justified in maneuvering the United States into a war with Germany.”

Robert Stinnett adopts this view in his book Day of Deceit, where he writes, “I sympathize with the agonizing dilemma faced by President Roosevelt. He was forced to find circuitous means to persuade an isolationist America to join in a fight for freedom.”

The standard justification for U.S. entry into the war is that otherwise Hitler would have defeated Britain and Russia and completed his conquest of Europe. With all the resources of the continent at his disposal, Hitler then would have been able to move against North America to achieve his dream of world domination.

There are several problems with this analysis. First, it greatly underestimates the difficulties of a trans-Atlantic invasion and grossly exaggerates Germany’s military capabilities even when she was at the apex of her power. It also confuses the conditions of December 1941 with those of June 1940. By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the fortunes of war were already beginning to turn against Hitler.

Moreover, there is no evidence that Hitler ever entertained plans for world domination. His primary objective was the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, which had disarmed Germany and led to her territorial dismemberment. Hitler was determined to reclaim these territories, and although negotiations were his preferred method, he was willing to wage war if necessary. His only overt plans for war involved an anticipated confrontation with Communism and the reacquisition of the “living space” that Russia had ceded to Germany in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918.

The outbreak of a general war in Europe was not a part of Hitler’s game plan but a consequence of Britain and France’s declaration of war against Germany after her invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.

Furthermore, although Hitler’s armies had overrun France in the spring of 1940, total victory was denied to them when the British Expeditionary Force escaped capture at Dunkirk. The defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain forced Hitler to cancel his cross-channel invasion plans. Britain had made it through the darkest hour, and as 1940 drew to a close her survival was essentially assured. As for Hitler, his hopes for a quick end to the war in the West were lost.

Germany’s June 1941 invasion of Russia, Operation Barbarossa, though remarkably successful in its initial stages, had failed by the end of the summer to achieve its primary objective: the destruction of the Red Army. Even as early as August 1941, the failure of the blitzkrieg was apparent, as Roosevelt began receiving reports indicating that Russia would, indeed, hold out. The onset of the Russian winter, the inability of German forces to take Moscow, and a major Russian counteroffensive on December 6 had dashed Hitler’s hopes for victory in 1941 and raised the specter of a mutually exhausting war that was unlikely to end in Germany’s favor.

While the ebb tide against Hitler was greatly assisted by the American Lend-Lease program, the crucial point is that both the British and Russians were able to blunt major German offensives and deliver severe blows to the Nazi war machine without direct U.S. military intervention.

So if U.S. entry into the war was unnecessary to prevent a victory by Nazi Germany in Europe, what remains of the case for Roosevelt’s “noble lie” regarding Pearl Harbor?

Imperial Japan was indeed on the move in East Asia, but it was unclear how that threatened the United States. Roosevelt never explained to the American people why they should be concerned with protecting European colonies in Asia from the Japanese. Moreover, Japan’s desire for a “Co-Prosperity Sphere” of economic and political predominance was hardly unique in a world where France, Britain, and the United States had all carved out spheres of influence. Japan’s crime in the eyes of the Western powers was being a latecomer to the colonial banquet. As one Japanese diplomat wryly remarked, “Just when we learn how to play poker, they change the game to bridge.”

True, Japan could be a cruel colonial master, especially in China. But it should be noted that while Roosevelt was quick to call out the Japanese for their atrocities, the United States had not flinched from resorting to brutal methods to pacify populations in her own colonies (See Alfred W. McCoy’sPolicing America’s Empire).

Some have argued the danger to the United States did not come from Germany or Japan but from the possibility that the two powers, along with Italy, would combine to encircle the western hemisphere. But this view greatly exaggerates the military capacity of the Axis Powers and misrepresents theTripartite Pact, which was a defensive alliance primarily intended to deter U.S. entry into the then-separate conflicts in Asia and Europe. Moreover, Germany and Japan never developed a coordinated military strategy.

Japanese ambitions were viewed by some geostrategists as a threat to U.S. naval operations in the Pacific and contrary to America’s long-term economic interests in the region. Such concerns are telling; for they betray a presumption of imperial entitlement that casts the Pacific war in a very different light than the standard historical account. Rather than being the crusade for freedom, the war begins to resemble a realpolitik clash of two mercantilist empires. Some have also suggested that American sentimentalism towards China and the hope for a restoration of the Open Door Policy were important in determining Roosevelt’s policies towards Japan.

But these were only contributing factors that facilitated Roosevelt’s drive to war. The lodestar of U.S. foreign policy in 1941 was entry into the European war against Germany. Frustrated by Hitler’s forbearance in the North Atlantic in the face of repeated provocation by U.S. warships, Roosevelt looked to the Pacific as the back door to war in Europe.

The standard history treats U.S. entry into World War II as moral and strategic imperative. But as demonstrated above, that assessment does not bear careful scrutiny. Nazi Germany was not about to conquer the world, nor was she in any position to threaten the United States. Indeed, Hitler’s bid for continental supremacy had been thwarted by Britain and Russia long before the United States entered the war. Imperial Japan was bogged down on the Asian mainland, hungry for raw materials, and anxious for a modus vivendi with the United States.

This history also ignores the enormous costs and horrifying consequences of direct American intervention. The Anglo-American bombings of German and Japanese cities killed more than a million civilians, most of whom were women and children. Most of the destruction in Western Europe occurred during the period of Allied liberation in 1944–1945 (See William Hitchcock’s The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe). And the decision by President Truman to drop atomic bombs on a prostrate Japan in August 1945 accelerated a nuclear-arms race that still threatens the incineration of the world.

On the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack, most Americans believed that there should be no large standing armies and that their government should heed George Washington’s admonition to steer clear of foreign entanglements. They ruefully remembered President Wilson’s “war to end all wars” and were in no mood for another crusade to “make the world safe for democracy.” That is why on December 6, 1941, the vast majority of Americans still opposed entering the war.

Pearl Harbor transformed the nation. The American people were outraged over Japan’s diabolical “sneak attack” and marched off to fight “the Good War.” A vast military-industrial complex was developed to stock the “arsenal of democracy.” After the war, more noble lies were told to justify a permanent national-security state, and the United States became the globe-girdling empire it is today; corrupt, bankrupt, bellicose, and shrouded in secrecy.

In his introduction to the Pentagon Papers, Mike Gravel quoted the British novelist and historian H.G. Wells:

The true strength of rulers and empires lies not in armies or emotions, but in the belief of men that they are inflexibly open and truthful and legal. As soon as government departs from that standard, it ceases to be anything more than “the gang in possession,” and its days are numbered.

Remember that quote when you come across Roosevelt apologists excusing his treachery as a “noble lie” and praising him for his foresight and statesmanship. Deceit is neither praiseworthy nor noble.

This article was first published by the Future of Freedom Foundation.

Crusading cause of cadets (DNS), IMU still dilly-dallying, Time for DGS to act

Published in Sagar Sandesh English Maritime Weekly Tabloid on Dec 5, 2012 edition

Source:http://www.sagarsandesh.com/epaper/

http://www.sagarsandesh.com/news/crusading-the-cause-of-cadets-dns/

While resentment against the continuation of Diploma in Nautical Science (DNS) programme among the more than 10,000 sea-time waiting cadets is growing day by day, conflicting signals, instead of positive, are emanating from Indian Maritime University (IMU) about the future of the course.

According to the latest notification from the IMU, decision to conduct IMU Common Entrance Test (CET) for February 2013 batch is yet to be taken in consultation with DG Shipping. “The same will be notified (to the affiliated institutes) after the decision is taken,” read the notification.

Normally, notification for IMU-CET February batch for the one-year DNS course leading to B.Sc. Nautical Science Programme on IMU campus and its affiliated institutes will be issued by November every year and the test will be conducted around December.

“While these 10,000-odd cadets are still waiting for mandatory 18 months sea-time to complete their degree, why IMU is still thinking of continuing the course, which would only add to the already bulged list,” is the agony of the affected students.

Meanwhile, Directorate General of Shipping (DGS) in a circular requested all the pre-sea institutes to submit the placement records of the candidates passed out from their institutes, during the years 2009, 2010 and 2011.

Whereas the submission of placement record has been made mandatory as per DGS Circular No.1 of 2008, till date many institutes have not submitted the required placement records - the circular noted the state-of-the affairs in maritime education.

According to sources, the move would help the DG Shipping to analyze the demand and supply pattern in the industry which is likely to influence on the future of the DNS programme.

“Stop the DNS course at once to give opportunity for those 10,000-odd cadets, who came to maritime institutes with loads of dream of becoming officers onboard,” declared Dr. R. Lakshmipathy, President of R.L. Institute of Nautical Sciences, Madurai (RLINS).

Speaking to Sagar Sandesh, Dr. Lakshmipathy said: “My prayer now to DG Shipping, the Shipping Ministry and Indian Maritime University (IMU) is that let them sit together and find out a permanent solution to this burning problem.”

“From my point of view, as a responsible man inculcating maritime education to thousands of students  for more than a decade, banning the DNS programme, like the ban on the Ratings enforced earlier, will be the perfect answer to those 10,000 plus students who are at crossroads,” Dr. Lakshmipathy opined.

This ban should not be lifted at any cost unless and until the entire glut is totally cleared and confirmed with appropriate proof that the hapless cadets are absorbed by the shipping companies and suitably placed, he suggested.

Dr. Lakshmipathy lamented that the IMU is plagued by corruption, nepotism, favouritism and the like.

Maintaining this ‘white elephant’, a Himalayan blunder committed by the predecessors, is a Herculean task for the current Vice Chancellor, Prof. G. Raghuram, and the new Chancellor, Dr. V. Krishnamoorthy, but they alone -with their past history of integrity, commitment and determination – can clean the Augean table with an iron hand coupled with a soft corner for the uncared for cadets. While appreciating the goal and intention of the present VC and DGS, he appealed to them to mercilessly weed out the unwanted elements and remove the excess staff who are indeed a pain in the neck of IMU, apart from being a burden to the august body.

With regard to the Union Shipping Minister’s version of fund crunch, Dr. R. Lakshmipathy urged the  Central Government to make separate allocation in the annual Union Budget. It is not fair and proper to allow or ask the educational institutions to raise funds to make good the deficit, from the hard-earned money of students, who sell their property and jewels or secure loans from banks, to pursue their studies in the ambition of becoming a seafarer.

V-C WAS POSITIVE

When Sagar Sandesh brought to light the issue of growing mismatch in demand and supply in DNS programme a few months ago, Prof. G. Raghuram, Vice- Chancellor of Indian Maritime University (IMU), had said that if the market is not there, the varsity should freeze the DNS course.

He also made it in crystal clear terms that there are thoughts (in the IMU circle) as to why not make it a B.Sc directly due to non-availability of 18-month sea-time slots for DNS cadets (by doing away with DNS diploma programme).

It is learnt that the IMU is under tremendous pressure from its affiliated institutions not to take any decision on DNS programme soon. According to informed sources in IMU, many institutions, which have invested heavily on infrastructure creation to accommodate any multiples of 40 students in a batch, are against any such a decision by IMU and any forced reduction in the prescribed intake of students or total suspension of the course would affect them very badly.

At this juncture, Dr. Lakshmipathy came down heavily on those money-minting institutions which take shelter in the name of infrastructure, claiming that they will have to suffer a huge loss if DNS or any such course is banned. If an embargo is enforced in all earnestness on these institutions, which may have proper infrastructure like chart-rooms and class-rooms, the already created ‘infrastructure’ can very well be utilized for teaching other courses or for any other academic related matters. Hence the question of incurring loss does not arise at all. Some of the avaricious institutions without basic amenities admit any number of ambitious students, make them the scapegoats in due course and leave them in the lurch subsequently – only to amass wealth to the coffer of the managements!

“Come what may, loss is not the matter but the cause is my concern. In R.L. Institute of Nautical  Sciences, we have stopped admission for B.Sc. (Nautical Technology) Course for the past two years as we do not want to produce cadets whose future will be in jeopardy”, he pointed out.

It is a pity to note that amidst this critical situation, these institutes have been approved with an intake capacity of 120, 160, 240, 247 etc.

DGS / IMU should pay immediate attention to collect the placement details of these institutes and monitor them with regard to DNS - both the placement as well as the infrastructure.

TASK FOR DGS

With the maritime educationists openly advocating for freeze in intake for DNS programme until the  demand-supply ratio settles at a healthy point, Mr. Gautam Chatterjee, the new Director General of Shipping (DGS), who took over the hot seat recently, has a big task in his hand to streamline the whole system before it assumes a monstrous proportion.

If the new DG Shipping takes some bold measures to fix the problem at once, it would indeed be a welcome gesture for those thousands of cadets who are still waiting for their sea-time slots to get IMU’s B. Sc Nautical Science degree.

Besides, a section of maritime educationists have also demanded the DG Shipping to take steps to reduce the intake of cadets for future DNS batches in recognized institutes on par with their placement records.

“If the system is strictly followed, only sponsored candidates would get their chance to pursue the course which will ultimately help the industry,” a senior member of the fraternity told Sagar Sandesh.

DNS STRUCTURE

The DNS course is a six-semester (three year) programme constituting three stages. Initially, a candidate is admitted to the one-year residential (2 semesters) presea course and on completion of I & II Semesters, the candidate will be awarded Diploma in Nautical Science (DNS).

This diploma programme is followed by one and a half year (3 Semesters -18 months) on-board ship training and the candidates will be awarded Advanced Diploma in Nautical Science.

After completion of the on-board training, the cadet has to do the sixth semester (the 6 months post-sea training) at the institute. Subsequently he has to appear for both written and oral examinations, conducted by Directorate General of Shipping. On successful passing out he gets 2nd Mate (FG)

Certificate of Competency from DGS and B.Sc. (Nautical Science) degree from Indian maritime University.

FLASHBACK

After the opening of the maritime training to private sector in 1996-97, there has been mushroom  growth in the number of such institutes conducting pre-sea courses, and as on date 138 institutes are approved for conducting various pre-sea training courses of both the discipline --Nautical and Engineering.

In a recent review by the DG Shipping on the approved intake of pre-sea courses against the training berths (sea-timing) the availability has revealed that the intake capacity created for pre-sea courses significantly exceeds the training berths actually available.

During the review, DG Shipping had expressed that the large and rapidly growing backlog of trainee officers who have completed their pre-sea courses, but are unable to get the training berths on board ships -- a pre-requisite for their Certificates of Competency in the entry grade -- is really a matter of serious concern.

As the Directorate felt that the situation is slowly going out of its control, it has initiated action by imposing a restriction on new approvals/ increase in capacity of the one-year DNS course in 2011.

It may be recalled here that the new approvals of GP and CCMC courses are also under ban since 2003 and 2007 respectively.

As the maritime institutes expressed apprehensions that the effect of elusive sea-time for trainee cadets could spell doom on their future, the DG Shipping discussed the matter in detail with the representatives of the Government, Indian Maritime University and the Shipping Industry to chalk out a real solution.

During the meeting, members agreed that due to bottlenecks of shortage of training berths vis-à-vis the annual output of pre-sea trainees from training institutes, there is an oversupply of cadets who are yet to complete their structured ship board training programme.

Taking a firmer step, the DG Shipping imposed a ban on increase in capacity by restricting new approvals /increase in intake in all pre-sea courses leading to entry level Competency either at the Second Mate level or at the level of MEO Class IV, whether Foreign Going (FG) or Near Coastal Voyage (NCV) .

Though the DG Shipping banned the increase, IMU and its affiliated institutes still continue to admit students in DNS course, thus playing havoc with the lives of innocent youths, who chose the seaborne career for their economic prosperity.

According to information available, the Directorate in 2006 came out with a training circular to put the  onus on the training institutes to obtain training slots on-board ships at the end of the graduation, failing which they should compensate the students by refunding the fees they have remitted. Then through DGS circulars in 2007 and 2008, as a measure of relaxation, it modified the strategy putting the

responsibility on the training institutes to tie up with shipping companies to get training slots for their cadets, failing which they should reduce their intake.

THE DIFFERENCE

Both the cadets with Diploma in Nautical Science and B.Sc have to undergo training, i.e. at the trainee level.

The DNS cadets complete one-year pre-sea training to be awarded the Diploma in Nautical Science Certificate. Then the cadets are required to do the on-board training as a deck cadet for a minimum of

18 months plus 6 months post-sea training prior to the B.Sc (Nautical Science) and the 2nd Mates written and oral exams. Then they, as per the company requirements, are posted as 3rd Officer in the respective ships.

While the B.Sc (NS) cadets are awarded B.Sc Nautical Science Degree from the college after the completion of 3-year pre-sea training in the college, the B.Sc. Nautical Science cadets have to complete a minimum of 12 months of onboard training as a deck cadet. Then appear for 2nd Mates (FG) exams only, after which they are posted as 3rd officer in some ship.

DNS LEADING TO B.SC (N S)

- 1-year Pre-sea Training

- A minimum of 18 months Structured Shipboard Training Programme (SSTP) and

- 6-month course ashore

- 2nd Mates Written and Oral exams

- Award of COC as 2nd Mates (FG) by DGS

- Award of B.Sc. (Nautical Science) degree by IMU

--- then the 3rd Officer

BSC NAUTICAL SCIENCE

- 3-year Pre-Sea training (B.Sc Degree awarded by the affiliated university)

- 12 months SSTP (minimum) * 2nd Mates Oral exam Conducted by DGS

- Award of COC as 2nd Mates (FG) by DGS

--- then the 3rd Officer

Legal remedy for the malady

It is worth recalling here that the DGS had issued a directive in 2008 to admit only sponsored students so that they do not encounter any problem for sea-time followed by placement. But this direction has been thrown into the winds and the unscrupulous institutions make hay while the sun shines by fleecing the gullible students. Those maritime institutions which sincerely impart education as per schedule and norms are learnt to have made up their minds to seek legal remedy for this ugly malady prevalent on the  campus, if the DGS directive is not implemented in letter and spirit forthwith.

Palestine refuses to disappear

Source: http://mondediplo.com/2012/12/02palestine

The Gaza ceasefire negotiated by Egypt has reinforced the position of Hamas regionally and internally. Meanwhile the UN voted to grant Palestine the upgraded status of non-member state, a success for Mahmoud Abbas. But the PA president faces opposition from the US, Israel and some countries in Europe — and scepticism from the Palestinians themselves.

by Leila Farsakh

Mahmoud Abbas, PLO chairman and president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) told the UN General Assembly in September 2011 that “at a time when the Arab people affirm their quest for democracy — the Arab Spring — the time is now for the Palestinian Spring, the time for independence.” A year later, despite his return to the same podium, independence seems more elusive than ever, and in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians appear unmoved, concerned instead with redefining the Palestinian political agenda.

The Arab Spring has led to an era of democratic aspiration unprecedented in the Middle East. In the Palestinian context, the Arab uprisings have emboldened popular demand to revisit, if not end, the regime that ushered in the Oslo peace process, and with it the two-states solution. It has brought to the surface an ongoing struggle — between Palestinian youth and the wider population against the political leadership and elites — in defining the content of popular protest and the future of Palestinian political struggle.

Palestinians took to the streets as early as February 2011 to support the Egyptian revolution. What soon became known as the March 15 movement, including youth groups, independent politicians and NGOs, went out in Ramallah, Gaza and Nablus demanding an end to the political division between Fatah and Hamas that since 2007 has kept them in respective control of the West Bank and Gaza. Both parties responded, signing three reconciliation agreements since May 2011, confirming the legitimacy of Hamas as part of the Palestinian political system. Yet these agreements have failed to produce any semblance of national unity and their officials have further alienated the population.

After May 2011 Palestinians continued to demonstrate, building on the work of civil society groups including the Stop the Wall Campaign, PNGO (the Palestinian NGO network), the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction Movement (BDS), and the popular committees in West Bank villages that support women, trade unions and political prisoners. They demonstrated outside Al-Muqata, the seat of the PA in Ramallah, marching towards Kalandia, a checkpoint village which blocks the road between Ramallah and Jerusalem; they campaigned through social media, and struck against increases in food prices.

Three key issues

The Palestinian protestors’ demands have coalesced around three key issues. First, they have called for the protection of Palestinian national rights, which they believe are not simply a right to a state, but the right of return for Palestinian refugees and equal political rights. During the May 2011 anniversary of the Nakba (the expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948), Palestinian youth joined organised groups and popular committees to demonstrate at major checkpoints and at the separation wall to reaffirm the Palestinian right of return.

They coordinated with Palestinians inside Israel, who held remembrance days in Palestinian villages destroyed in 1948. They also joined forces with youth groups in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon seeking to enter Israel through the borders of those countries, to affirm the centrality of the right of return in popular activism.

The second demand is for resumption of the Palestinian democratic process. The demand is not confined to new elections for the PA and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in the West Bank and Gaza.

Al-Herak al-Shababi al-Mustakil, Palestinians for Dignity and other youth groups have called for new elections for the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the legislative body of the PLO that represents all the Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories, including refugees, the diaspora and Palestinian citizens of Israel. The PNC, which has not convened since 1988, has been marginalised politically by the Oslo peace process: Palestinian activists in the West Bank and Gaza wants it to be reinvigorated. Towards this, the young are creating coalitions with groups in the diaspora who have previously asked for its revival (1). Together they are attempting to reunify the politics fragmented by Oslo, trying to reactivate the democratic process from the bottom up and give voice to constituencies Oslo silenced.

The third demand focuses on the Oslo impasse: the demonstrators want to stop a “peace process” that exists only in name, and end political cooperation with Israel. Early this year, Palestinian youth demonstrated against the resumption of indirect talks between Israeli and Palestinian officials in Amman, and protested against joint Israeli-Palestinian peace activists meeting in Jerusalem and Ramallah, demanding no more contact with Israelis until Israel ends the occupation. Since the summer, Palestinians have gone on strike and demonstrated against the PA’s austerity measures. Many want it dismantled.

So Palestinian activists are now trying to reframe the nature of the Palestinian struggle as being for rights, not statehood per se. Following the lead of the BDS campaigns launched by 170 civil society organisations in 2005, activists are now reiterating that the Palestinian struggle consists of fighting what they define as an Israeli apartheid regime, and aiming to defend three fundamental rights; the end to occupation, the right of return and the right to equality inside Israel.

Going to the UN

The PA’s decision to seek UN membership for the Palestinian state can be read as an attempt to bypass the stalemate in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and to deal with overwhelming popular opposition to the Oslo accords and the rule of Hamas and Fatah. Comparing Abbas’s speech this year to the UN General Assembly with last year’s speech reveals sharply the extent to which the PA has been trying to accommodate the demonstrators’ language, while attempting to monopolise the Palestinian political agenda.

Both speeches try to link the “Palestinian Spring” with the quest for statehood and independence, and to engage the international community by asking it to fulfil its responsibility towards the Palestinian people. The main difference is that in 2011, the PA submitted a request for full UN state membership, but did not get the nine votes necessary to submit it to the Security Council for consideration, mostly because of US opposition. This year, Abbas requested full non-member state status, similar to that of the Vatican. If granted, the upgrade would allow Palestine to become a member of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Court and other UN agencies, enabling the PLO to pursue Israel for war crimes and other violations; this is similar to the legal strategy used at the ICJ in 2005 to object to Israel building the separation wall inside the West Bank rather than along the 1967 Green Line. But the upgrade would not resolve how the occupation is to end or the right of return be protected.

For the PA, this UN move is the only way to assert the Palestinians’ right to an independent state on 22% of historic Palestine, including the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital (all declared as occupied under UN Security Council resolution 242). Abbas said the return of these lands would provide relative reparation for the expulsion of 1948; it is the price to reach peace with Israel and implement the international consensus on the partition of Palestine, established since 1947 by UN resolution 181. Abbas argued that only a state recognised by the international community can protect Palestinian rights.

To answer dissent about his prerogative to speak in the name of all Palestinians, Abbas points out that the Palestinian state project has been endorsed by the PNC since the declaration of independence in 1988. He recalls that it is the PLO, not the PA, that is presenting the UN bid (2). In both speeches he reiterated the unity of the Palestinian people, mentioning refugees, those under occupation and Palestinians citizens of Israel, as well as the diaspora.

What is new in the UN bid is the attempt to re-internationalise the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By going to the UN, Abbas hopes to shake, if not end, US monopoly of the peace process. This strategy became clear when he said on 23 September 2011: “The question of Palestine is intricately linked with the UN via the resolutions adopted by its various organs and agencies ... We aspire for and seek a greater and more effective role for the United Nations in working to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in our region.”

A year later the tone has hardened. In the latest UN speech in 2012, Abbas draws more directly on the language used by Palestinian protestors. He describes Israel not simply as “settler colonial” as in 2011, but also as implementing “apartheid” policies and “ethnic cleansing” in East Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied territories, terms Abbas avoided using until then. In 2011 he was still trying to extend his “hand to the Israeli government and the Israeli people for peace making ... based on parity and equity between two neighbouring states — Palestine and Israel.” In 2012 he squarely puts the blame on the Netanyahu government, which “rejects the two-states solution” and is “emptying the Oslo accords of their meaning.”

Outrage over Oslo

In this way Abbas showed that he is responding to popular outrage over Oslo and the futility of negotiating with Israel while the occupation continues. The stronger tone of 2012 also reflects his frustration at Israel’s intransigence.

He told the UN the final map and borders that Israel is offering the Palestinians is one of “enclaves ... subject to full dominance of military colonial occupation, only packaged under new names.”

This year’s speech also shows his anger at the international community, and indirectly the US, unlike last year, when he was optimistic that the international community would help reignite the peace process. This year he laments that it allows Israel “to be permitted to evade accountability and punishment”, and provides Israel with a “licence for the occupation to continue its policy of dispossession and... entrench its system of apartheid against the Palestinian people.”

Moreover, Abbas mentions for the first time that the only way to reach peace “must first and foremost be predicated on the understanding that racial settler colonisation must be condemned, punished and boycotted in order for it to be completely halted.” He seems to have heard the Palestinian civil society call for BDS (boycott, divestment and sanction). The question remains what political leverage the PA can get from its UN bid, and what legal strategy it will pursue to engage the UN in international sanctions against Israel.

Meanwhile Palestinians back home seem to have given up on their leadership. The municipal elections of 20 October in the West Bank confirmed the dwindling legitimacy of Fatah, as independent candidates won in major cities — Nablus, Ramallah and Jenin. Popular participation in these elections showed yet again the Palestinians’ determination to defend their rights to freedom and dignity, irrespective of whether or not they get their state soon. Israel’s war on Gaza has further validated their stand.

Chennai Port to outsource entry passes issuing work

Published in Sagar Sandesh Maritime Weekly

Chennai:

Sagar Sandesh News Bureau:

With a view to enhancing the quality of service and also making the port premises a highly secured place, Chennai Port is planning to outsource the work of issuing entry passes soon.

According to a top official in Chennai Port Trust, the move would substantially improve the security of the port, besides ensuring better service for pass-seekers round-the-clock.

For complying with the ISPS Code and also to check and monitor entry of persons and vehicles inside the port premise, Chennai Port started issuing computerized entry passes since early 1990s and it is being done in three different places to ensure quick service.

Though these passes are being issued for the past several years, the port does not have a documented data of its visitors, which would help the port monitor pattern of movement throughout the year.

As per the latest estimates, the port issues about 4,000 passes everyday to different vehicles.

“By outsourcing the pass-related work to a private player, who will be responsible for issuing as well as documenting all the needed details of persons and vehicles entering the harbor round-the-clock, the port is attempting to give its users a new experience,” a senior ChPT official told Sagar Sandesh.

Besides, the electronically gathered information about the visitors and vehicles would come as a handy tool for the port management in situations where a person or a vehicle did something wrong inside the port premises, the official said.

Moreover, such data would help us analyze the pattern of movement inside the port at any given point of time, and it will also help the port to curb entry of erring vehicles and persons easily,” the top official added.

Meanwhile, a group of port trust staff, who were working in the concerned section, asked the port management to reconsider the decision of outsourcing. They claimed that it would lead to revenue loss for the port trust.

However, port officials maintained that the proposed outsourcing would not only bring in the much needed efficiency in satisfying the pass-seekers, but it will also plug security holes by enabling electronic documentation.

It may be noted here that Mormugao Port Trust, Goa, outsourced the pass-related works some two years ago and it has been proved there as a best system for continuous monitoring.

Shipping sector of women, by women; not for women alone

Published in Sagar Sandesh Nov-28 edition

Source:www.sagarsandesh.com/epaper

Chennai:

Sagar Sandesh News Bureau:

If you think the shipping sector and its allied services like clearing and forwarding, brokering and chartering vessels are purely in male bastion, change your vision, because women are also taking centre stage of late.

The question ‘Why not I?’ a few years ago had landed Mrs. G. Sripriya into a new world, where she heads an all-woman team to cater to the industry’s logistics needs.

More than 30 women are working in her dream company - Transy India, which looks after project forwarding, ship brokering, NVOCC and port agent works for different clients in the country.

Sagar Sandesh caught up with the budding woman entrepreneur in the shipping and logistics arena at her posh office in Chennai and she was very candid in telling us how the idea came and materialized into a reality.

Excerpts of the interview:

SS:Give us the background and profile of the company?

Mrs. G. Sripriya : Transy India, part of the TRANSY/AGS shipping group, is a global transport group with offices in Antwerp, Archangelsk, Astana, Baku, Chelyabinsk, Conakry, Dusseldorf, Ekaterinburg,  Frankfurt, Houston, Kiev, London, Moscow, Mumbai, Novorossiysk, Novosibirsk, Odessa, Rotterdam, Shanghai, St.Petersburg and Vladivostok.

TRANSY has now opened a regional head office in Chennai dedicated to the Indian market and offering local clients a direct gateway to Europe, Russia and Africa.

Q : How come the idea of only women, that too in a male-dominated shipping and logistics field, popped up?

A : I rise with business background as my father owned a transport company. I observed his style of work from my childhood, which motivated me to be a successful woman entrepreneur. Our all woman

team is supporting us to be a major successful player in the logistics domain in the country. When it comes to competition, we do not bother about domination or anything else, but our 100% focus will be on the quality of service.

Q : How is the industry response for this venture?

A : Yes, We did have initial troubles and difficulties, but we overcame them with a lot of confidence and captured the firm market space only because of our quality of service.

Q : How do you manage the state of affairs with the all women staff?

A : Though it’s a business opportunity in this competitive world, I see it (employing all women) as my  social obligation because I believe helping a woman to come up in life is like supporting the whole future generation or society.

Q : Tell us about your future plans?

A : We have already made our presence felt in many countries and our next plan is to expand our services all over India.

Q : Any remarkable memory that drives your passion for such a unique venture?

A : Yes, I have always a question in my mind " why not I" which has driven me to “what I am now". One fine day, I had a spark why not I in this male-dominated business which turns a lot of passion towards this venture. I understood it requires a lot of focus and concentration which help me to be a one of the successful players in this domain.